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ABSTRACT
Caesarean delivery is a common and life- saving 
intervention. However, it involves an overall increased 
risk for short- term and long- term complications for both 
mother and child compared with vaginal delivery. From 
a medical point of view, healthcare professionals should, 
therefore, not recommend caesarean sections without 
any anticipated medical benefit. Consequently, caesarean 
sections requested by women for maternal reasons can 
cause conflict between professional recommendations 
and maternal autonomy. How can we assure ethically 
justified decisions in the case of caesarean sections on 
maternal request in healthcare systems that also respect 
patients’ autonomy and aspire for shared decisions? 
In the maternal–professional relationship, which can 
be characterised in terms of reciprocal obligations and 
rights, women may not be entitled to demand a C- 
section. Nevertheless, women have a right to respect for 
their deliberative capacity in the decision- making process. 
How should we deal with a situation of non- agreement 
between a woman and healthcare professional when the 
woman requests a caesarean section in the absence of 
obvious medical indications? In this paper, we illustrate 
how the maternal–professional relationship is embedded 
in a nexus of power, trust and risk that reinforces a 
structural inferiority for women. To accommodate for 
beneficial use of power, these decision processes need 
to be trustworthy. We propose a framework, inspired by 
Lukes’ three- dimensional notion of power, which serves 
to facilitate trust and allows for beneficial power in 
shared processes of decision- making about the delivery 
mode for women requesting planned C- sections.
BACKGROUND
A caesarean section (CS) can be a life- saving inter-
vention for both mother and child. While, in some 
parts of the world, lack of access to and underuse 
of CS may have devastating consequences, there is 
an emerging concern for the increasing use of CS 
conducted in the absence of obstetric indications.1 
Worldwide, the CS rates increased from 12% in 
2000 to 21% in 2015.1 The highest CS rates today 
are found in the Latin America and the Caribbean 
(44%). Disparities are wide between and within 
countries. In China the rates range from 2% to 62% 
between provinces.1 Delivering by CS is associated 
with higher socioeconomic status in low- income 
and middle- income countries,1 while the oppo-
site has been shown in a high- income country like 
Norway.2 In European studies, preference for CS, is 
associated with psychosocial vulnerability.3–5
WHO originally promoted a CS rate to be between 
10% and 15%6 Later, a worldwide study identified 
the lowest maternal and neonatal mortality to be 
associated with CS rates up to 19%.7 There are 
no available evidence from randomised control 
trials comparing outcomes of vaginal vs caesarean 
delivery for low- risk women lacking obstetric 
indication.8 Still, CS is in general associated with 
increased risk for short- term and long- term health 
complications for both mother and child, and are 
increasing with repeated caesareans.9 While the 
risk for short- term complications (including wound 
infections) are relatively low following planned 
caesarean delivery,10–12 complications can occur in 
subsequent pregnancies such as abnormal placen-
tation, uterine rupture, unexplained fetal death 
and postpartum haemorrhage.13–15 Consequently, 
decision- making, especially for first- time preg-
nancies, should involve consideration of future 
pregnancies and implications across the reproduc-
tive lifespan. For the newborns, planned CS may 
increase the risk for breastfeeding problems, respi-
ratory distress16 and transfer to neonatal intensive 
care unit.17 In the long run, increasing evidence 
suggest that a planned caesarean delivery, affects 
the development of the child’s immune system by 
providing a vulnerability for immune- mediated 
diseases such as asthma, allergies, diabetes mellitus 
(type 1) and coeliac disease.18–20
Along with the general rise in medically neces-
sary caesarean deliveries, many countries have 
experienced a rise in women requesting planned CS 
in absence of obstetric indications.1 21 22 Approxi-
mately 2.5% of births in the USA are suggested 
to be delivered as caesarean sections on maternal 
requests (CSMR).23 Scandinavian estimates suggest 
a prevalence of CSMR between 1% and 3% of 
births.21 24–26 The reported willingness to comply 
with maternal requests and attitudes toward 
maternal autonomy vary among obstetricians across 
European countries. The lowest willingness is found 
in Spain and France, and highest willingness is 
within the UK and Germany.27 Maternal autonomy 
to choose a planned CS has been debated among 
professionals and ethicists,28–33 and guidelines vary 
between countries regarding how to handle these 
requests.34 35
Opposing autonomous claims and the call for 
shared decisions
Respect for autonomy is one of the leading 
ethical principles of medical practice today. It is 
one out of the four equally important principles 
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress; respect 
for autonomy, beneficence, non- maleficence 
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patients implicitly includes respecting their capacity and wish 
for self- determination.37
Numerous interpretations and understandings of autonomy 
goes beyond the general notion of self- determination.38 In the 
much cited version proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, an 
autonomous decision must be intentional. The actor needs to 
have deliberated on the decision with a proper understanding of 
the relevant information and needs to be free from internal and 
external control (eg, mental health states, coercion and decep-
tion) 36 39. In medical practice, the usual interpretation of patient 
autonomy is that patients have a right to refuse offered treat-
ment, but the patient may not have a right to choose treatment 
outside of the ‘healthcare menu’ as defined by the healthcare 
professionals and/or policy- makers.38 According to this view on 
patient autonomy, a woman cannot demand a planned CS unless 
a physician finds it medically indicated. According to Norwegian 
guidelines, for example, indications for CS are met when the 
anticipated benefit for the mother and child is higher with a CS 
compared with a vaginal delivery.35 Even if the woman does not 
hold a specific right to demand a treatment that is not medically 
indicated, she should still be respected for her ability to delib-
erate and take part in decisions in healthcare. But how should 
this capacity be respected when deliberation does not neces-
sarily lead to consensus between the woman and the healthcare 
provider on the final decision?
The maternal–professional relationship constitutes a moral 
relationship of mutual (autonomous) rights as well as an obliga-
tion to respect each other.37 Even if she does not have the right to 
autonomously demand whatever she likes, the woman’s ability 
to deliberate and reach conclusions should be respected. The 
necessity of her willing cooperation with professionals during 
a vaginal delivery—which can be mentally and physiologically 
challenging—adds to the importance of involving the woman in 
decision- making. Professionals hold a right to act in accordance 
with their professional integrity and make adequate medical 
decisions in line with their specialist knowledge and clinical 
judgement.37 An obstetrician, who is formally responsible for 
the consequences of the medical intervention, may thus object to 
operating on a woman who requests a CS against medical recom-
mendations. Theoretically, this can be described as a situation of 
opposing autonomous claims. Practically, one party must give 
up its claim to make the decision. This means one party must be 
subjected to the will of the other, which involves lack of power 
to control the situation. On the individual level, this can create a 
damaging experience of powerlessness. On the societal level, this 
can create structures of power that support relative domination 
and subordination of either professionals or patients.
Aim
In the following, we discuss the nexus of power, trust and risk 
that surrounds the maternal–professional relationship. We argue 
that the decision- making process should be structured to facili-
tate trust and allow for beneficial power to exist rather than to 
focus on ideals about autonomous choices and shared decision- 
making. Leaning on Lukes’ notion of power and an account for 
how it can be turned to serve beneficial purposes in healthcare, 
we justify a realistic rather than idealised conceptualisation of a 
shared decision- making process and propose a framework for 
ethically justified decision- making in the case of CSMR.
Power, trust and risk
In order to find conditions for an acceptable decision- making 
process and to promote healthcare personnel’s power to do 
good, there is a need to broaden the context of analysis beyond 
the construction of autonomy. A useful perspective is proposed 
by Grimen.40 According to Grimen, the nature of the patient–
professional relationship lies in general within what he calls ‘the 
nexus of power, trust and risk.’ When someone reaches out for 
healthcare, that person’s health is left in the custody of someone 
else (a professional) who is capable of taking care of it. This 
then transfers discretionary power over that person’s health 
to a professional who possesses the special knowledge, judge-
ment and discretionary space to provide care. By trusting the 
professional to provide beneficial help, that person also takes 
the risk of being provided with insufficient and/or harmful care. 
However, patients’ options for help in a society where tasks are 
organised by division of labour are quite limited. According to 
Grimen, trust can occur voluntarily, or it can be forced due to 
the lack of alternative options.40 His conceptualisation of trust 
is thereby broader than definitions that exclude perceptions of 
trust as phenomena emerging from dependency.41 42 Overall, a 
patient’s trust, or at least lack of mistrust, facilitates the profes-
sional’s power base.40 Trust is risky and makes patients vulner-
able to adverse consequences. When one trusts, according to 
Mark Warren, one gets benefits of cooperation in exchange for 
some risk for harm.43 Thus, trust allows power to do good to 
exist in healthcare and is crucial for healthcare to be provided.40
Power is used to provide benefits along with the ethical prin-
ciple of doing good for patients in healthcare, but it can also be 
misused and cause harm.36 Overall, there is no reason to believe 
that professionals would want to misuse power in their daily 
work. Still, power has this potential, and doctors’ professional 
autonomy, which represents quite some space for discretion and 
clinical judgement, creates a substantial space for any kind of 
power. According to Grimen, the power imbalance within the 
patient–professional relationship manifests itself in different 
ways: the gap in medical knowledge and skills between the 
parties, the lack of options for seeking adequate help elsewhere, 
and the issue of professionals’ gatekeeping roles for protection 
of social goods.40 This leaves patients reaching out for help 
with a structural dependency on professionals, but this is also a 
dependency we might have to accept. We agree with Grimen’s 
claim that radical changes to the nature of this relationship may 
not be sufficiently beneficial to patients.40 The alternative of 
leaving adequate medical education and care to everyone instead 
of a small group does not allow for specialisation and is not a 
sustainable approach.
Power, trust and risk in the maternal–professional 
relationship
Power can also foster trust through lack of options (forced trust), 
through delegated discretion by authorities, and through fore-
casted efficacy.44 Likewise, trust can be lost due to emergence 
of other options, such as complementary medicine and private 
healthcare. Due to dismissed legitimacy, for example, by repre-
sentations of mixed motives such as providing care and saving 
public resources. Or due to perceived lack of efficacy caused by 
for example negative healthcare experiences and negative media 
publicity.44 The legitimate authority of professionals has been 
challenged in the last few decades due to increased access to 
medical knowledge among patients (e.g., via internet) as well as 
the establishment of patient rights and structural regulations of 
healthcare.
Public trust has been heavily challenged by the emergence of 
what Onora O’Neill describes as a culture of suspicion.45 She 
questions whether the evermore complex systems of account-
ability, in terms of requirements on reporting measurements, 
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foster trust and power to do good in today’s healthcare institu-
tions include promotion of ethical quality and communication 
during the medical encounter. The ethics of meeting a patient as 
a whole person may replace paternalistic authority as a basis for 
trust.44 46 Introducing shared decision- making is an example of 
attempts to restore trust and thereby enable power to do good 
to exist in healthcare. Accepting division of labour in society and 
patients’ structural dependency on medically educated others 
does not force us to completely reject such an idea. Rather, this 
prompts us to accept a conceptualisation of shared decisions that 
is in tune with real- world presences of the very same power and 
dependency. It is not our aim to discuss such a complete concep-
tualisation here, but we will argue below in favour of including 
dialogue in a practice- relevant concept as it relates to the case 
of CSMR.
Towards a beneficial ‘shared process of decision-making’
Given the structural dependency of patients on professionals, 
it seams unrealistic to hold on to an ideal of shared decision- 
making assuming that both parties influence the conclusion of 
what to do with equal power. Moreover, ‘shared process of 
decision- making’ seems more realistic to aim for. This would 
especially be so when differences in the desired outcome are what 
bring the parties to negotiation in the first place. We will return 
to the implications of this below. Nevertheless, at this stage of 
analysis, there are several reasons for arguing that CSMR calls 
for equality in influencing the dialogue of the decision- making 
process. First, there are nuanced reasons and obstetric histories 
behind maternal caesarean requests. Such as previous birth and 
postnatal experiences, and perception of own risk and fear.47 48 
Quality healthcare, therefore, calls for individual assessments 
and personalised, as opposed to standardised, recommenda-
tions. Morally, if clinical encounters between the woman and 
the professional regarding CSMR are to serve the best interests 
of the woman and child, both parties have the mutual obliga-
tion of facilitating an open and honest dialogue. The woman 
must reveal her reasons for the presumed benefit of the interven-
tion. The professional should provide accurate information and 
a well- justified medical recommendation. If a woman does not 
provide any beneficial reason for her CS request, an obstetrician 
has strong reasons to object to operating in complete lack of 
expected benefit.37 If the level of evidence is weak regarding the 
safest delivery mode, the recommendation should reflect this.
Second, the subjective perspective of the woman is clinically 
relevant. CS represents a surgical interference on a physiolog-
ical process the female body is made to handle and leads to an 
elevated risk. Therefore, vaginal delivery is recommended in 
a low- risk pregnancy.9 However, an unwilling vaginal delivery 
increases the risk of post- traumatic stress and depression among 
women.49 50 Experience of coercion may provide more future 
harm than benefit for the woman and her child. Individual eval-
uation of the risks and benefits of planned CS should also include 
prospective physical and mental health for the mother and child. 
It is not necessarily true that professionals hold a better capacity 
to judge future mental health prospects than the woman herself 
does. This calls for dialogue.
Fostering dialogue is necessary, but it is not enough to make 
the notion of a shared process of decision- making both realistic 
and ethically acceptable in case of CSMR. To see what more is 
called for (again inspired by Grimen40), we will apply Lukes’ 
account51 of power to explore and identify requirements for 
promoting beneficial power. We hereafter conceptualise ‘bene-
ficial power’ as a form of power that is applied by healthcare 
professionals to promote patient treatment without suppressing 
patients’ experiences or points of view.
Three dimensions of power and shared process of decision-
making
According to Lukes’ original framework of power, power can be 
realised through three dimensions.51 The first dimension refers 
to coercion (including physical force) where A coerces B to do 
something. The second dimension of power occurs when A is 
controlling the agenda for the interaction with B. In medical 
encounters, professionals present information and options 
as well as define the needs for follow- ups. Hence, they hold 
considerable power over the terms for the encounters, that is, 
what is to be revealed to and considered by patients. The third 
dimension of power entails that A controls B’s view on the world 
and how her situation is defined (eg, as illness/not- illness or as 
normal/abnormal).
For women who are requesting CS in absence of obstetric 
reasons, their perspective on what would be best for them often 
originates outside of or prior to the clinical encounter. However, 
when trust exists, professionals enjoy the beneficial power (and 
possess an obligation) to deliver honest information through coun-
selling and avoid misconceptions about safety among women.52 
Denying a woman the option of a planned CS when she insists 
on a self- perceived need after an informed process illustrates the 
power obstetricians hold over defining her need. This is based 
on a conceptualisation of medical indication and control over 
treatment options. Moreover, professionals set the agenda of 
interaction, controlling the process of decision- making by deter-
mining the time, schedule and aims of the meetings. Finally, they 
can indirectly coerce women into vaginal delivery. In Norway 
obstetricians have the final say about delivery mode.35 In the UK, 
physicians are expected to comply with persistent requests after 
counselling or refer the woman to another provider in the case 
of objection.34 Hence, patient choices and informed consent in 
maternal care can be influenced by agenda setting, worldview 
control and even coercion. Obstetricians hold both the power 
to control the content and scope of the dialogue and the right 
to refuse to provide CSMR. This increases vulnerability in her 
situation and may increase her perception of risk involved in 
trusting professionals and their decision about delivery mode. In 
the following section, we suggest structural initiatives to facili-
tate trust and enable beneficial power in the counselling process 
for caesarean requests.
How to facilitate trust and beneficial power in decisions 
about CSMR: a framework
Based on our discussion, we here suggest a decision making 
framework that promotes trustworthy beneficial power, that is, 
power without suppressing features. The framework consists 
of seven requirements, which all have to be present in order 
for decision- making power of healthcare personnel to be truly 
trustworthy.
First criterion
Deciding on delivery mode when the woman requests a CS 
requires a shared decision- making process to avoid harm. 
Equal respect between both parties requires reciprocity 
regarding the exchange of information. This means that the 
healthcare worker must knowledgably inform the woman 
about the intervention, and the woman must expose her 
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Second criterion
The mere possibility of being forced into a feared vaginal delivery 
should be off the table when the aim is to foster a trustworthy 
and beneficial decision- making process without suppressing 
coercion. The dialogue must be carried out without any agenda 
of pressuring the woman to opt for vaginal delivery. It must also 
avoid convincing her that, at the end of the day, she will not have 
or is unlikely to have a planned CS. Allowing for appeal for a 
second opinion if the dialogue does not bring about consensus is 
a way to promote this.
Third criterion
The third criterion relates to Lukes’ second dimension of the 
concept of power, that is, the ability A has to control the agenda 
for interaction with B. For the dialogue to be beneficial, it should 
take place on the premises agreed on by both parties. This means 
that the woman should be involved in the planning of future 
meetings with respect to time issues, whom to meet, and what 
to discuss. Some women may prefer to meet with an obstetrician 
while others may prefer counselling led by a midwife. Psycho-
logically trained teams would be beneficial. Standardised proto-
cols for these meetings and conversations could undermine the 
beneficial power healthcare workers might exercise toward these 
women.
Fourth criterion
Lukes’ third dimension of power concerns A’s ability to control 
B’s view of the world as well as how the situation is described. 
Any authoritative use of technical medical terms, such as claims 
on ‘normal’ delivery modes or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ procedures, 
by the healthcare worker does not support the use of beneficial 
power and should be avoided. To avoid controlling the perspec-
tive of the situation at hand, the healthcare worker should also 
be open about risk factors concerning the individual. Further-
more, the probability of complications should be communicated 
along with the certainty of evidence.
Fifth criterion
In order to ensure that all women receive the same neutrally 
conveyed information without any undue influence of the world 
view of the professional, an information sheet should be made 
available for them and for the public. This requirement allows 
for critical assessment and debate about presented interpreta-
tions of research regarding risks and benefits of planned delivery 
modes.
Sixth criterion
To support and foster beneficial power of care providers, a 
professional endorsement of use of beneficial power should 
be reflected in healthcare education programmes and codes of 
ethics.
Seventh criterion
To institutionalise the trustworthiness of professionals’ aim to 
use their power to do good, involves holding them accountable 
for their use of power. Regulatory mechanisms ensuring that 
requirements 1–6 are in place as well as a possibility for appeals 
by women who have experienced suppressing power abuse are 
both needed.
Lack of trust inhibits communication and cooperation. Both 
are vital for counselling and delivery care.41 If this frame-
work is implemented to accommodate ethically justified use of 
power in decision- making about delivery mode, then women 
have reasons to trust professionals’ motives, information and 
recommendations throughout the counselling process. If trust is 
ensured, benefits can emerge from the asymmetric power rela-
tions and serve the interest of women and their children.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown how women are placed in a situ-
ation of structural inferiority in the maternal–professional rela-
tionship when requesting a planned CS for maternal reasons. 
Although she may not be entitled to demand a planned CS, she 
should be included in decision- making processes about delivery 
mode. We have used Lukes’ account of power to illustrate a need 
for structural initiatives that women can find trustworthy. This 
may allow beneficial power to exist in these consultations and we 
have proposed a framework to implement these initiatives. The 
normative premises for this particular framework, that is, the 
call for promotion of power that is beneficial for patients, might 
be relevant for framing other ethically challenging decision- 
making processes as well.
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